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Abstract 
Survey data show that post-Tayloristic production concepts are not developing to the 
extent that many researchers had originally expected. It also is inadequate to portray 
post-Taylorism as a development that is happening, but just slower than expected. 
This is inadequate because there are counter tendencies: the resurgence of the 
assembly line in the highly paradigmatic automobile assembly, the rise of the 
McDonalds-type organization and continuing skills-replacing automation. 
The paper sets out to explain this persistence. First it considers possible reasons for 
decision-makers to be attracted to Taylorism. Then it turns to reasons for disliking 
Taylorism. To some extent, it is possible for managers to work around these 
problems; however there are more ways to tackle these problems by making 
modifications to Tayloristic patterns, while keeping basic principles intact. So the 
adaptability is an important explanation for the resilience of Taylorism. Finally the 
paper makes inferences from results obtained in organizations where a more radical 
break with Taylorism was attempted. 
Introduction 
If we wish to have a bearing on where the organization of work is headed, it is vital to 
consider the development of Taylorism. Is it being superseded by a new paradigm or 
is it being modified? Is it possible to find an underlying logic in the development of 
Taylorism? Can one locate agency in the change process or do we have to stick with a 
contingency approach? 
An analysis of Taylorism can hardly proceed without a definition since interpretations 
of Taylorism tend to vary. The central feature of Taylorism is the separation of 
conception from execution. Managers achieve this by applying three principles. The 
first principle of "scientific management" as Taylor called it, is the decoupling of the 
labor process from the skills of the workers: "The managers assume [..] the burden of 
gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past has been 
possessed by the workmen and then of classifying, tabulating, and reducing this 
knowledge to rules, laws, and formulae" (in Braverman 1974: 112). 
The second principle is: "All possible brain work should be removed from the shop 
and centered in the planning or laying-out department" (in Braverman 1974: 113). 
The third principle is, that management should not leave it to the workers to decide 
how they go about their tasks. Instead, management should prescribe exactly how, 
and how fast, the tasks must be performed. The context in which these principles are 
located is logistical streamlining and standardization of components. 
Taylorism is a refinement of the management strategy of detailed division of labor. It 
is important to draw a sharp distinction between detailed division of labor and 
specialization. Through specialization, people can develop themselves further in their 
crafts or professions; whereas detailed division of labor reduces people to performers 
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of routine tasks. Detailed division of labor entails analyzing a production process and 
breaking it down into a multitude of tasks performed by different workers. In this 
way, a craft-based labor process that was once controlled by the workers themselves 
falls to pieces. Then, managers put the pieces together to create a process that is under 
managements' control. The financial advantage of this strategy is that it becomes 
possible to hire less well-paid workers. This principle was already clearly stated by 
Charles Babbage in 1832, the same Charles Babbage who devised the first computer 
architecture (Braverman 1974: 188). Taylorism tends to carry the detailed division of 
labor to new extremes, where work cycles are measured in seconds.  
Taylorism implies low-trust relations between employer and employees. Therefore 
direct control is needed to ensure that labor power bought is turned into labor 
performed. This control question urges managers to find ways of imposing on 
workers what they should do, in what way, within which limits and at what pace, and 
to evaluate work performance and apply sanctions. Taylor's prescriptions amounted to 
reliance on a raft of supervisors, but the Ford Motor Company proved that a 
mechanically paced assembly line is a more efficient control system. The assembly 
line functions as a system of technical control, which means that the entire production 
process or large segments of it are based on a technology that regulates the working 
pace and controls the labor process (Edwards 1979: 112-113). The assembly line 
supplants the direct conflict between worker and foreman. Scientific management, as 
an explicit method, became unfashionable after the 1930s. Its principles, however, 
continued to have an impact on the design of jobs (Braverman 1974: 119, De Sitter 
1981: 21, Schumann et al. 1989: 67, Merkle 1980: 3). A workable concise definition 
of Taylorism is: management strategies that are based upon the separation of 
conception from execution. 
 
Taylorism is enduring and resilient 
In 1980s there were signs - at least on paper - that in some sectors Taylorism was 
coming to an end. Kern and Schumann (1984: 19) reported a rise of "new production 
concepts" in the core sectors of German industry, the automobile, machine tools and 
chemical industries. These new production concepts revolve around greater respect 
for skill and worker involvement. This means that in the core sectors, the polarization 
between elite and routine workers is disappearing. Product quality, flexibility and 
enabling technology are given as reasons for this change. Routine workers would 
become ”system regulators”. System regulators monitor the actions of automated ma-
chinery and intervene when they deviate from their programmed course. Piore and 
Sabel (1984) claimed that flexible technology and fragmentation of markets would 
usher in an era of "flexible specialization". However, it seemed that the change 
process was not universal. Kern and Schumann, for example, specifically excluded 
the food sector. Later research into the spread of new production concepts showed 
that  - even in those core sectors - change was less than expected, maybe even non-
existent. System regulators remained few, around two to five per cent. 
Even in an almost completely (99 per cent) automated production phase, like spot 
welding in body construction, it turned out that few of the workers had risen to system 
regulator. 95 per cent of them were still engaged in manual welding and correcting 
faulty weldings. Only five percent of the workers in the spot welding phase were 
working as system regulators (Schumann et al. 1989). Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem 
(1995) could classify only two per cent of the jobs as system regulator jobs.  
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A large-scale study on information technology in the European service sector (Child 
and Loveridge 1990: 360) concluded that banks rarely exploited the new possibilities 
of broader access to pooled information and knowledge and that "modifications to 
existing hierarchies are modest". Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem (1995) found that in 
Belgian car plants, management was pushing towards enhanced predictability and 
uniformity of actions. A mammoth trend study on rationalization in the German car, 
chemical and machine tool industries (Schumann et al. 1994: 659, Schumann 1998) 
concluded that the division between conception and execution proved stronger than 
had been predicted a decade earlier (in Kern and Schumann 1984). Professionalization 
was not a sufficient condition for emancipation. Moreover, the study found that a 
substantial gap remained between direct and indirect sectors, between "new 
production specialists and specialized specialists".  
Studies that emphasize change exist as well. In the UK, Gallie, White et al. (1998: 
290-292) were impressed upon finding indications of upskilling. Intrinsic interest in 
work increased. Employers delegated more responsibility to workers. There was more 
task discretion. Explanations advanced were new technology, more sophisticated 
control and new management techniques that implied a shift from control to 
commitment. However there was "no evidence of an increase in the participation of 
employees in organizational decision-making" (Gallie, White ea. 1998: 315). Sisson 
(1996: 27), surveying the state of research on European workplaces concluded that the 
number with “high performance work systems" was "negligible". Vallas (1999) found 
that centralization of control and standardization of methods are on the increase. 
Assessments of the spread of post-Tayloristic production concepts vary, but a safe 
conclusion seems that Taylorism is, contrary to earlier rumors, very much alive. 
Moreover, it is inadequate to portray post-Taylorism as a development that is 
happening, but just slower than expected. This is inadequate because there are counter 
tendencies. In the automobile industry, there is a resurrection of the assembly line 
(Schumann et al. 1989, Pruijt 1997: 112, Shimokawa, Jürgens and Fujimoto: 1997, 
Springer 1999). 
This is extra significant because, historically, job design paradigms tend to spread 
from the car industry: the assembly line from Ford, semi- autonomous teams from 
Volvo and lean production from Toyota. 
The application of pure Taylorism has areas of solid growth, such as the McDonalds-
type firm ("McDonaldization"), characterized by predictability and controllability 
(Ritzer 1993), and call centers. Furthermore, advanced automation can entail the 
incorporation of human skills and decision making into machinery, and thus the 
removal of brainwork from the shop floor - a key element of Taylorism. 
Thus Taylorism is both enduring and resilient. In the following sections I will 
consider possible explanations. 
 
Attractions of Taylorism 
There are several points that make Taylorism attractive to managers. Two stand out 
because they are core elements of Taylor's doctrine, and are not dependent on 
particular circumstances. A core attraction of Taylorism is that it promises that the 
best possible method, "the one best way" will be used. Whether there exists a one best 
way to work may be a matter of philosophical debate. Taylor strongly believed in it.  
But also in highly modern discussions about organizational learning in the context of 
mass production we find this assumption. For example, Adler and Cole (1995: 169) 
write: “Standardization captures best practice and facilitates the diffusion of 
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improvement ideas throughout the organization – you cannot diffuse what you have 
not standardized". In this view, standardization means that, for each task X, the best 
way is determined and laid down in rules. Everyone who has to perform this task X, 
must follow the rules for X exactly. 
In the area of software engineering, one finds the same notion in the Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) from Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering 
Institute. The CMM consists of a hierarchy of five maturity levels. At the lowest level 
there is no stable process management. At the second level there is project 
management and processes are repeatable. At the third level the notion of the one best 
way comes in. Processes are documented and standardized. In the whole organization, 
employees follow these processes consistently. The fourth level adds quantification 
and measurement. The top level entails optimization, continuous improvement (Bach 
1994, Montgomery 1995). Japanese "software factories" are prime examples of 
process standardization in the software industry (Cusumano 1991). 
The second core attraction of Taylorism is: it promises to be a means against what 
Taylor called "systematic soldiering". Although this may look old-fashioned or taboo, 
this concern is as relevant today as ever. When European managers compare their 
plants with similar Japanese plants, they often find a productivity gap at their 
disadvantage (c.f. Pruijt 1997: 108-110). At Daimler-Chrysler in Germany, the current 
strategy for rationalization was deemed to be too much based on responsible 
autonomy, while in Japanese plants standard worksheets were important for 
productivity. These standard worksheets specify the order of operations and the time 
allowed for them. The reasoning behind this boils down to this: when granted 
autonomy, workers in mass production do not put in a maximum effort (Springer 
1999). 
Beside the core attractions of Taylorism there are more contingent ones. Tayloristic 
control can compensate for a lack of employee motivation. It also allows hiring 
cheaper workers and tapping into an unskilled labor market. And downsizing is more 
compatible with a low-trust type of organization than with a high trust type. 
Moreover, Taylorism itself creates the conditions for its propagation. As Zuboff 
(1988) has shown, advanced automation tends to disempower workers to handle 
unexpected situations, which leads to the necessity of advancing automation even 
further. Similarly, in organization in which employees are systematically following 
detailed rules, a likely reaction to imperfections is creating more rules. 
The Tayloristic attractions listed above assume rational choice. We should, however, 
not forget that rationality is not the only driver. For example: information about F. W. 
Taylor's behavior in his private life shows him as a person who was obsessed with 
control. This personality trait was already evident in his youth (Kanigel 1997: 104; 
Morgan 1986:204-207). Ritzer (1993) also noted the irrationality of rationalization. 
 
Modifications of Taylorism and the logic behind these 
There are many reasons for job design decision makers not to like Taylorism. 
However, there are many opportunities to neutralize these points - allowing pure 
Taylorism to persist in repainted form, or to modify Taylorism to keep it alive in the 
face of changing environment conditions, thereby creating Neo-Taylorism. 
 
A few of these drawbacks in particular already hindered Taylor himself. One of these 
drawbacks is, that Taylorism is expensive because it entails creating jobs for non 
value adding supervisors and other indirect workers. Taylor wanted to subdivide the 
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work that was usually performed by a single gang boss among eight men: route 
clerks, instruction card clerks, cost and time clerks, gang bosses, speed bosses, 
inspectors, repair bosses and a shop disciplinarian (Taylor 1911: 104). Taylorism is 
not just a movement for efficiency by also a movement for providing jobs in the 
production process for the middle class (Merkle 1980). 
In 1901, when the United States Steel Corporation took over the cradle of Taylorism, 
Bethlehem Steel, it laid off sixty specialized foremen (Kanigel 1997: 355). To 
Taylor's dismay, the high costs led employers to dilute the model (Bloemen 1988: 41). 
In the Toyota production system we find a carefully designed modification that deals 
with this drawback of indirect labor costs while preserving the focus on the one best 
way. In this system, first level supervisors do double duty: they supervise and work 
(from time to time) on the line as well. Misleadingly, these supervisors tend 
sometimes to be called team leaders. In the Toyota production system, the team leader 
has a fixed position. Management appoints team leaders. The main difference 
between a Taylorist low level supervisor and a Toyota team leader is that the Toyota 
team leader has to perform production work himself (Grønning 1992: 135). Job 
design is firmly rooted in Taylorism. An essential element of the Toyota production 
system is that for each task there is a "standard work sheet" that contains the cycle 
time, the order in which the worker must carry out the operations and the standard 
inventory that belongs to the task (Ohno 1988).  
At Toyota, team leaders perform the detailed definition of operations and set the times 
for these. They do this on the basis of a coarse planning provided by a central 
department. Team leaders do time studies, and coordinate with leaders of parallel 
teams.  
Paul Adler (with co-authors) describes a further modification of Taylorism along the 
line of combining production work with industrial engineering (Adler 1992; Adler 
and Borys 1996; Adler and Cole 1993). When studying "New United Motor 
Manufacturing, inc" (NUMMI), a U.S. joint venture of Toyota and General Motors, 
Adler found that production workers themselves were doing work analysis with 
stopwatches. Apparently this is a special feature of the NUMMI plant. Adler (1992: 
37) notes that at Toyota, mainly team leaders perform work analysis. 
Adler (1992) quotes a NUMMI manager who explains this as a result of a “history of 
more conflictual relations with supervisors and industrial engineers” compared to 
Japan. In Japan team leaders can do the work analysis because of the trust placed in 
them by the workers. 
From Adler's paper (1992) one can glean one limitation of the NUMMI system: it is 
impossible or difficult to increase the time allowed for operations. This poses 
problems for older workers when times have been set on the basis of the performance 
of young workers. Adler turned the NUMMI model into a new production concept, 
"democratic Taylorism". This comprises work analysis by workers, team meetings, 
kaizen and a heavily promoted suggestion scheme, all combined with strict 
standardization of work. At Daimler-Chrysler, managers expect this model to 
supersede responsible autonomy. 
 
A widely noted problem of Taylorism is that it is not conducive to flexibility. There is 
one exception: Taylorism does boost numerical flexibility: it makes it easy to quickly 
integrate new workers in a production process, and it allows laying off workers 
without losing knowledge from the organization. Faced with the need to respond more 
quickly to varying customer demands, managers might be able to retain large 
Tayloristic production units for the predictable parts of production, while having 
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semi-autonomous teams operating in parallel with this to provide flexible quick 
response capability. The old Babbage principle remains in force: division of labor 
makes it possible to hire cheaper workers.  
Huys, Sels and Van Hootegem (1995) found that Belgian car plants did acquire the 
capability for flexible adaptation, but not through discussions among workers. On the 
contrary, it was sophisticated planning in advance that produced flexibility.  
Mass customization is another Tayloristic route to flexibility. Modular construction 
allows customization based on simplified work. In mass customization, it is possible 
to use an information system for collecting parts together and for generating 
customized instructions to workers (Laudon and Laudon 1996: 95).  
During Japan's reconstruction, Taiichi Ohno, the designer of the Toyota Production 
System, faced the challenge of producing a variety of car models within a small 
production volume. This led to a set of solutions. One still fits within classical 
Taylorism: perfecting setting up and die change procedures to speed these up 
dramatically. A second solution entails a modification of Taylorism: letting workers 
perform a variety of tasks. One worker operates several machines, which may be of 
different types, simultaneously. The machines have built-in control systems, which 
means that they can operate partly unattended. Attending a machine is seen as waste, 
so workers make rounds hopping from one machine to the next (Ohno 1988, 10-11). 
Job rotation enables workers to learn of broad set of skills. However, these skills are 
as shallow as possible. In Ohno's (1988: 22) view, machines must be fool proof. It 
should be possible to learn the correct working procedures within three days. 
 
A related problem of Taylorism is loss of innovative capacity. Solutions for 
companies to satisfy their innovation needs within the framework of Taylorism are 
buying up small, innovative companies, or concentrating innovation in a separate 
department or in a "skunk works". In this way, the jobs of the main work force can 
remain routine. A problem that is also related to flexibility is the information problem 
of central planning. Organizations with a high level of central planning suffer the 
same kind of information difficulties that centrally planned economies have. Tackling 
this problem while remaining inside Taylorism means avoiding granting autonomy to 
the shop floor level. Information systems can be used to take care of this. 
Alternatively, a ban on buffers (i.e. intermediate storage), as advocated in lean 
production, can increase transparency. Also the kanban system can be seen as a means 
of decreasing the information processing load at the central level while keeping shop 
floor autonomy at bay. 
 
Taylorism leads to inherently unattractive work on the shop floor. The resulting lack 
of motivation may be counteracted by the pay system and by careful selection of 
workers. Especially when there is near full employment, this is not sufficient. Low 
unemployment means that employees have the option to avoid degrading jobs. In the 
1960s for instance, when there was full employment in the Netherlands, Philips faced 
high turnover rates for assembly line workers. This prompted Philips to start 
experimental reforms that in some cases developed into team working (Teulings 
1977: 220). This phenomenon disappeared as unemployment soared in the 1970s. In 
Sweden, however, full employment remained throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. 
There, the unemployment figure for 1970 was 1.5 per cent. For 1986, it was 2.7 per 
cent. Labor turnover, absenteeism and recruitment difficulties led Volvo management 
to search for alternatives for the assembly line in car production. In the early 1990s, 
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recruitment problems prompted Japanese car companies to introduce reforms 
(Benders 1996). 
 
One stumbling block that is manifest from the beginning of Taylorism is that it 
clashes with democratic values, especially with autonomy. In Western societies, loss 
of autonomy is not a desirable vision. In managerial discourse, the clash between 
Taylorism and autonomy gives rise to a language game in which the meaning of 
autonomy is emptied out. Thus, Womack, Jones et al. (1990: 14), while describing a 
production system that is (according to the information that they provide themselves) 
based on assembly lines and in which work cycles are around one minute, assert that 
“most people - including so-called blue-collar workers - will find their jobs more 
challenging as lean production spreads” and that “lean production calls for learning 
far more professional skills and applying these creatively in a team setting rather than 
in a rigid hierarchy”. “Management stresses that problem-solving is the most 
important aspect of any job” (Womack, Jones et al. 1990: 199). 
When promoting business process reengineering, Hammer and Champy advocate 
Tayloristic solutions such as the use of knowledge based information systems to 
replace "highly trained" specialists with “generalists” (Hammer and Champy 1994: 
38), “triage” (i.e. splitting off difficult cases and assigning these to specialists) or in a 
decentralized organization, using centralized computer controls. Nevertheless, they 
claim that: "Instead of separating decision-making from real work, decision-making 
becomes part of the work. Workers themselves now do that portion of a job that, 
formerly, managers produced" (Hammer and Champy 1994: 53). They say that work 
becomes  “more rewarding since people’s jobs have a greater component of growth 
and learning” (Hammer and Champy 1994: 69). And they tell us that “Companies that 
have reengineered don’t want employees who can follow rules; they want people who 
will make up their own rules” (Hammer and Champy 1994: 70). 
 
Taylorism is a formalized, bureaucratic system. As such, it provides subordinates a 
form of protection against arbitrary control. This was a reason why some unions 
accepted the system in the 1920s. 
There are also paradoxes attached to bureaucratic power. Full specification of tasks 
and promotions that are governed by rules reduce the power edge of supervisors 
(Crozier 1964: 187-189). As long as subordinates stick to the rules noting can happen 
to them; the rules always give some leeway. Progressive bureaucratization increases 
this leeway. Crozier points out that "the power to make decisions and to interpret and 
complete the rules, as well as the power to change the rules or to institute new ones, 
will tend to grow farther and farther away from the field where those rules will be 
carried out" (Crozier 1964: 189). 
The more predictable the system becomes, the more powerful become those who 
control a source of uncertainty (Crozier 1964: 192). And in a fully bureaucratized 
system, the subordinates are considerable sources of uncertainty.  
In accounts of the Japanese organization of production we find indications that 
Taylorism is modified by injecting uncertainty at the supervisor level. Dohse, Jürgens 
and Malsch (1985: 141) describe this form of organization as "the practice of the 
organizational principles of Fordism under conditions in which management 
prerogatives are largely unlimited." This reflects in the Japanese notion of 
competitiveness. Competitiveness means permanent rationalization even at 
economically good times and flexible, vague working arrangements without 
precedent-setting agreements (Grønning 1992: 3). This involves Taichi Ohno’s “Oh! 
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No!” method in which workloads are calculated at 100-110 per cent. This makes 
overtime a structural requirement. Through kaizen this overtime is reduced. 
Subsequently managers increase workloads (Grønning 1992: 27). 
In the Japanese system, one finds that bonuses represent a large proportion of the 
wage packet (up to 50 per cent). Individual bonuses are based on assessments by 
supervisors on how deeply a worker cooperates in the system. Group bonuses are also 
given (Cf. Dohse, Jürgens and Malsch 1985 137-138). Workers have to compete for 
better jobs and job boundaries are relatively permeable (Burawoy 1999). 
 
There are many reasons why Taylorism might not appeal to managers: supervision 
cost, lack of flexibility, loss of creativity, central information processing overload, 
unattractive work on the shop floor, a clash with democratic values, bureaucratization. 
However, there are ways to deal with all these points without giving up the central 
characteristics of Taylorism. This adaptability helps explain the endurance of 
Taylorism. 
Smashing Taylorism 
Supervision cost, lack of flexibility, loss of creativity, central information processing 
overload, unattractive work on the shop floor, a clash with democratic values and 
bureaucratization can also be reasons to develop an alternative to Taylorism. When 
we explore these, we enter the realm of anti-Taylorism. 
Anti-Taylorism involves consciously moving towards job enrichment instead of 
division of labor and towards a reduction of the separation of conception and 
execution. It also means choosing to use human skills instead of trying to incorporate 
these into information systems. It further entails striving towards worker autonomy 
and codetermination instead of increasing discipline. 
Anti-Taylorism does not necessarily mean putting the quality of working life before 
productivity. Anti-Taylorism takes improvement of the quality of working life as a 
condition for improvement of performance. In contrast, neo-Taylorism takes 
improvement of the quality of working life as a possible side-effect of the 
improvement of performance. 
What does anti-Taylorism look like, and does it work? These questions were 
addressed in a study of 150 cases of initiatives to achieve an organization of work that 
breaks with the Tayloristic pattern (Pruijt 1997). Results can be summarized as 
follows:  
Deliberate policies directed against low-trust employment relations exist. In some 
organizations, innovative managers, staff personnel and union groups are creating 
alternatives. Examples are decoupling workers from the assembly line, setting up 
semi-autonomous teams, sometimes with rotating team leadership and 
decentralization of detail planning to the shop floor. The innovators receive support 
from researchers who, combining consultancy and research, accumulate expertise on 
changing working life and feed this back into organizations. National unions have 
supplemented their bread-and-butter activities with involvement in the organization of 
work. So did politicians, who, in several countries, pressed for working life legislation 
that covers work organization as much as health and safety. And in Scandinavia and 
Germany, there are state-sponsored research and development programs that explore 
alternative forms of organization. These programs include efforts to develop 
technologies that could support change in organizations. 
This counter movement was in part driven by recruitment and turnover problems. 
However, it survived when unemployment rose. Attaining flexibility was a continuing 
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motive, but also the unease and stress, both for employees and managers, that comes 
with low-trust employment relations. An analysis of 150 cases based in Scandinavia, 
the UK, the Netherlands and Germany showed that it is possible, with monumental 
effort and a lot of ingenuity, to achieve real change on the shop floor level.  
 
Leaving autonomy on the shop floor level implies that there is no enforcement of a 
one best way. There will be variation between teams in the way of working. An 
example is the IHC shipyard in the Netherlands. A change program involved the 
creation of semi-autonomous teams. Teams had to choose coordinators and the idea 
was that all tasks should be performed by all team members. Special training courses 
were part of the program.  
One of the teams in the IHC machine factory chose not to have any coordinators, they 
were happy when they got rid of their bosses. They did not participate in the courses 
either. They also disregarded the official line of diminishing the division of labor: 
they kept a special person around who does nothing but removing burrs. Management 
accepted this, since the team’s performance was on a par with the other team in the 
same workshop that did participate in all aspects of the change program.  
 
The change efforts produced economically viable solutions in the following areas: 
alleviation of technical discipline (for example by decoupling workers from the pace 
dictated by an assembly line) and job enrichment (often supported by a skill-based 
pay system). To production work, tasks were added as quality control, maintenance, 
setting and programming machines, administration, logistics and contact with 
customers. A further area of change is decentralization of responsibility. This entails 
changes such as: previously a planning department would issue a production schedule 
for each day, in the new way of working teams get assigned a workload for a week. It 
is now up to the team to perform the detail planning. 
We also see that operatives get the authority to call in a technician when something 
goes wrong; traditionally in production organizations only supervisors may do this. 
 
Notwithstanding the successes, a notable proportion of the organizations later 
regressed to a more Tayloristic pattern. This happened to several organizations that in 
the literature have become known as successful innovators. 
Regression can be the result of tensions developing within semi-autonomous teams in 
which there is a rotation team leadership. Team leaders can refrain from taking 
unpopular decisions, because of the risk of revenge when someone else is team leader. 
Apart from this there is a substantial chance that within teams a Tayloristic structure 
crystallizes. More assertive team members start dominating and make sure that less 
assertive team members do the less attractive routine tasks. Here we see a paradox: 
decentralization of responsibility gives workers the opportunity to organize the work 
by themselves in a Tayloristic fashion. 
It also happens, that the new structures disappear when central champions of the 
change programs - managers or trade union activists - leave the firm. 
The diffusion of successful alternatives was a weak point as well. 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
Taylorism persists because its attractions are relevant in large sectors of the economy. 
Irrational factors (anality) play a role as well. Moreover, Taylorism is very adaptable. 
Breaking away from Taylorism is possible, but it requires a lot of energy. It is now a 
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matter of unorganized struggle; it is worthwhile to pursue alliances between change 
oriented managers and worker representatives on the one hand, and researchers on the 
other hand. There may be extreme cases where (neo)-Taylorism is unbeatable, for 
example in the most routinized parts of mass production. On the other hand, there 
may be areas where anti-Taylorism is the automatic choice. However, such a 
distinction is never clear-cut, it remains open to contestation and experimentation. 
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